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WORKFARE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
PUBLIC SECTOR
NANCY E. HOFFMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal Welfare Reform Law of 1996 has presented
striking new challenges to New York State's public administra-
tion. The program provides a generous amount of freedom to the
state's allocation of its welfare resources, but it challenges the
entitlement guidelines of the 1938 state constitution so that ei-
ther legislative action or a constitutional convention might be
necessary to effect the program's proper implementation.
The establishment of a welfare workforce is perhaps the
most complex aspect of this federal policy. New York State is a
relative pioneer in the implementation of workfare, and with one
of the largest welfare workforces in the country, it is at the fore-
front of the welfare controversy. New York State will be moni-
tored carefully by the nation, and its progress may determine a
great deal about the future of the 1996 welfare reform initiative.
Workfare was implemented to change the perception of de-
pendency created by the welfare system. Integral to the success
of the workfre program is the management of labor law issues.
Just as New York's constitution could not anticipate the welfare
workforce, neither could state and federal employment and labor
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statutes. This article focuses primarily on the resolution of the
labor issues that the welfare workforce creates, giving particular
attention to the protections and benefits that workfare partici-
pants are entitled to receive. The resolution of these issues will
be instrumental in shaping the entitlement programs of the fu-
ture.
II. WELFARE MANDATES OF THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION
Article 17, Section 1 of the New York Constitution states:
"The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and
shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and
in such manner and by such means, as the Legislature may from
time to time determine."1 This 1938 amendment is premised on
the belief that the State has an obligation to care for its sick and
needy.
As New York proceeds with the implementation of welfare
reform, this legal responsibility to provide for the "aid, care and
support of the needy" may be in jeopardy. Questions will arise as
to the legality of cutting off benefits to legal immigrants, ending
some federal welfare grants, and imposing a five-year time limit
on benefits for adults. In addition, there will be contrary opin-
ions on the definition of who is "needy" and on what constitutes
minimum "care" and "aid" under the New York constitution.
There may also be issues regarding the private delivery of wel-
fare services and the level of accountability that may be lost as a
result of such privatization.
The state constitution could be changed through one of two
approaches. Either a constitutional convention may be called to
place amendments on the ballot for voter approval or the legisla-
ture may take action. First, constitutional changes are possible
because the New York constitution requires New Yorkers to vote
on whether they would like to call a convention every twenty
years. This question was on the ballot in 1997, but the voters de-
cided that a convention was not desirable. Second, in order for a
legislative change to the constitution to be successful, the pro-
posal must pass the legislature in two successive terms separated
by an election, and then be put on the ballot as a popular refer-
endum. As such, this process takes a minimum of two years.
1 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (McKinney 1987).
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III. THE 1996 LAW
The present changes in welfare law seem to suggest the need
for, or at least the possibility of, a complementary change in New
York's constitution. Federal control over welfare grants has been
decreased. While the decrease allows the state greater freedom
in tailoring its welfare program, it presents complications as
well. The budgeting flexibility given to New York makes it apt to
breach Article 17, which was written in 1938 and does not meet
the complexities of the contemporary welfare state.
One change in New York that causes such difficulty is the
replacement of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") program with a block grant system called the Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF) program. Under
TANF, grant money is not guaranteed for New York's poorest
children as it was under the AFDC, but instead is used at the
discretion of the state. Should New York choose not to allocate
this money to the poor, it may be violating Article 17. Further-
more, under the new law, an individual can only receive welfare
benefits from the federal fund for five years, subject again to New
York's discretion, should it seek a shorter limit. Such a choice by
the state might also constitute a violation of Article 17.
Similar inconsistencies between the state's guarantees and
the federal law may arise with respect to TANF's allowances for
state management of benefits for the needy. Public health care
facilities are likely to see increases in the amount of uncompen-
sated care they provide, since federal money can now be allocated
away from them by the state. Federal nutritional programs,
which work to meet the needs of poor families, senior citizens,
and the disabled, may also face budgetary constraints in lieu of
TANF allowances. Furthermore, children receiving Social Secu-
rity Income must be re-evaluated and may lose their benefits
unless they qualify for Medicaid or TANF. Depending on one's
interpretation of Article 17, this decrease in benefits may violate
New York's constitutional guarantees to its citizens.
Further problems arise because some programs under TANF
were not anticipated by the state's constitution. States must now
create work-based assistance programs using federal block
grants, and complex new issues result from such a program. One
problem is that the New York labor market is experiencing sig-
nificant unemployment difficulties, exacerbated by an influx of
cheap workfare laborers who displace those already employed.
1999]
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Workfare workers have no workplace protections, and OSHA, so-
cial security, and unemployment benefits must be mandated for
them if a two-tier labor market is to be avoided in New York
City. Work requirements for food stamp entitlement, along with
other developments, jeopardize the spirit and language of Article
17.
A. Work Requirements Under the New Law
The Welfare Reform Law requires New York State to in-
crease participation in work activities for TANF recipients. Un-
fortunately, the private sector's low-wage labor market is un-
likely to generate the number of necessary jobs for the millions of
welfare recipients. To meet the work requirements, New York
will likely turn to the public sector, flooding government agencies
with welfare recipients who are allowed under the new law to fill
regular job vacancies. The federal law does not mandate mini-
mum wage payments for welfare recipients who work, and their
coverage under various state labor laws is in question.
Recently, the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department
noted that "an AFDC recipient may be assigned to participate in
a [Work Employment Program] only if 'the number of hours a
participant is required to work in any month does not exceed the
number of hours which would result from dividing the house-
hold's monthly grant amount.., by the highest of: (i) the Federal
minimum wage; (ii) the State minimum wage; or (iii) the pre-
vailing rate of pay for persons employed in the same or similar
occupations by the same employer at the same or equivalent site.' "2
The court stated that New York is required to obtain "a determi-
nation of the prevailing rate of pay from the Department of Labor
[DOLl before making [an] assignment."3
B. What New York Must Do Under TANF
TANF is a demanding program. It requires that adults re-
ceiving assistance be working within two years. Mandatory work
participation requirements are part of the program. The re-
quirements provide that, in each social service district, 25% of
adults in all families must be in an acceptable work activity
2 Church v. Wing, 645 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1996) (quoting 18
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 385.12(k)(5)).
3 Id.
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during 1997,4 with the rate ultimately increasing to 50% by
2002. 5 For two parent households, the minimum work participa-
tion requirements are 75% in 1997 and 1998, and 90% in 1999
and thereafter.6
In order to count a TANF recipient as working, that individ-
ual must work a minimum of twenty hours a week during 1997.7
This number will increase to thirty hours per week by fiscal year
2000 and thereafter.8 Parents in single family homes with chil-
dren under age six need only work twenty hours per week to
meet the federal requirements, 9 but for a two parent household to
be counted as working, one adult in that household must work
for at least thirty-five hours per month.'0 The state is required to
provide the equivalent of the minimum or prevailing wage to all
workfare participants.
Though the Welfare Reform Act provides no specific parame-
ters for welfare jobs, certain positions, including community
service programs and childcare in community service, seem ac-
ceptable" to recipients in the community service programs.
Workfare participants must not be placed in a currently occupied
job or in a position where another individual is on layoff from the
same or any substantially equivalent job. Laying off a regular
employee in order to accommodate a workfare participant is also
prohibited.
To enforce this rule, the state is required to set up a griev-
ance procedure for anti-displacement complaints. Sanctions
permit the state to disqualify from aid those individuals who do
not meet the program work requirements, refuse an offer of em-
ployment, or voluntarily quit a job without good cause. Parents
of children under age six, however, cannot be punished for not
complying with work requirements if their reason for noncompli-
ance is lack of childcare. New York must also limit food stamp
4 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 335-b(1)(a) (McKinney 1992). This will require the
creation of 81,000 jobs for 1997 alone.
5 See id.
G See id. § 335-b(l)(b).
I See id. § 335-b(1)(d)(i).
s See id.
9 See id. § 335-b(3).
10 See id. § 335-b(1)(d)(ii).
11 See id. § 336. Other acceptable jobs include: unsubsidized employment, subsi-
dized private and public sector employment, work experience, on-the-job training,
job search and job readiness for up to six weeks, and vocational education.
1999]
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benefits for childless adults between eighteen and fifty years of
age to three out of thirty-six months, unless they are working
twenty hours per week or participating in a work program, or
unless New York receives a waiver from the federal government.
C. What New York May Do Under TANJF
The law also provides more flexible options. New York may
fill vacant positions with workfare participants, though it does
not have to. The state and local governments may provide
greater displacement protections than those provided in federal
law. New York may also exclude single parents with children six
years old or younger from meeting the work requirements if ac-
ceptable childcare is not available.
The state may also opt out of the requirement that adults re-
ceiving TANF participate in community service programs within
two months of receiving assistance. It may satisfy the work re-
quirements by choosing jobs from the list of options that are least
disruptive to the wage labor market. To this extent, the state
can try to find those positions most likely to lead to real jobs for
recipients. In areas of high unemployment, the state can ask for
a waiver from the United States Department of Agriculture's re-
quirement that childless adults between the age of eighteen and
fifty be limited to three months of food stamps in any three-year
period, unless they are working or participating in a job pro-
gram.12 New York may also reduce the exemption from the work
requirements under the Food Stamp program for parents of chil-
dren under age six. Furthermore, it can "cash out" food stamps
to use as a wage supplementation for employees. If New York
chooses to "cash out" food stamps, it must devise a plan for mov-
ing recipients from subsidized to unsubsidized employment
within a specific period of time.
IV. MANAGERIAL AND STATUTORY ISSUES
There are a number of important labor issues broadened by
the creation of a welfare workforce and the new welfare law.
A. Privatization
There is serious concern that there will be an increased risk
of privatization and loss of merit system civil service protections
12 See 7 U.S.C. § 2026(5) (1994).
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under the new TANF program. Under the new law, the state
may contract out the administration of the TANF program and
choose to have Medicaid eligibility determined by the TANF
agency.13 The state may contract with charitable, religious, or
private organizations to administer all or part of the TANF pro-
gram. The state may also contract with these organizations to
provide TANF service. Private job placement agencies may be
contracted with, and vouchers can be used to pay for job place-
ment services for TANF recipients. The administration of child-
care funds and foster care maintenance can also be contracted to
private institutions.
B. Standards for Being an "Employee" Under the Taylor Law
The term "public employee" means "any person holding a po-
sition by appointment or employment in the service of a public
employer, except... judges and justices of the unified court sys-
tem, persons... in the organized militia... and persons who
may... be designated... as managerial or confidential."14 The
term "public employer" means:
(i) the state of New York,
(ii) a county, city, town, village or any other political subdivision
or civil division of the state,
(iii) a school district or any governmental entity operating a
public school, college or university,
(iv) a public improvement or special district,
(v) a public authority, commission, or public benefit corporation, or
(vi) any other public corporation, agency or instrumentality or
unit of government which exercises governmental powers under
the laws of the state.15
The New York State Public Employment Relations Board
("PERB") standard to determine whether employees are "public
employees" was set forth in State University of New York v. Pub-
13 It is unclear at this time, given the choice New York has under the new law to
use the TANF agency to administer Medicaid eligibility, whether Medicaid eligibility
functions can be contracted out. It seems that conflicting language exists both al-
lowing and prohibiting Medicaid eligibility functions to be administered outside of a
merit-based system (civil service).
14 N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 201(7)(a) (McKinney 1983).
15 Id. § 201(6)(a).
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lic Employment Relations Board.16 The court found that PERB's
standard in determining whether graduate students were public
"employees" within the meaning of the Act was a rational inter-
pretation and not subject to reversal. 17 The standard requires
that the employment relationship between worker and employer
be regular and substantial in nature and that no evidence exist
showing that the legislature intended to exclude that employ-
ment relationship from coverage. These principles were reiter-
ated in University of the State of New York v. Newman, 8 where
the court upheld a PERB ruling that employees operating Re-
gents college degree programs were "public employees" within
the meaning of the Act.
Additional standards were articulated in In re Local 1170.19
There, PERB found that the town's receiver of taxes was not a
public employee within the meaning of the Taylor Law, because
the town did not possess authority to discipline or discharge the
employee, and thus lacked any cognizable degree of control over
that worker.
In a case in which the labor union sought to accrete New
York City workfare participants into existing bargaining units,
the arbitration panel ruled as a matter of law that they were not
"municipal employees" or "public employees" under the New York
City Collective Bargaining Law. The panel relied upon the leg-
islative history of the workfare program, which it believed
showed no legislative intent for the workfare participants to en-
joy "employee" status. The panel also viewed the "compulsion" to
work as a factor that distinguished workfare participants from
workers in traditional employment relationships. 20
This may not be the deciding factor in workfare worker
status, however, because it may not be necessary for a union to
wait until employees are classified before petitioning to represent
16 586 N.Y.S.2d 662 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1992).
17 See id. at 664.
18 585 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (App. Div. 1992) ("The vestiges of antiquity retained by
petitioner's unusual structure during its evolution to its current status cannot
change its decidedly public function.").
19 27 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 27-3023 (1994).
20 In re District Council 37, No. RU-760-80 (Office of Collective Bargaining, June
20, 1981); see also NAT'L EMPLOYMENT L. PROJECT, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF
WORKFARE PARTICIPANTS AND DISPLACED WORKERS 44 (1996) [hereinafter NELP].
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them.21 PERB's Declaratory Ruling procedures can be used to
obtain a jurisdictional determination as to whether an employer
or employee is public, 22 and this may be important to the future
of workfare participants.
C. National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") Standards
The NLRA defines "employee" as "any employee" not explic-
itly excluded. Exclusions include agricultural and domestic
workers, individuals employed by their parents or spouse, inde-
pendent contractors, supervisors, and persons employed by an
entity that is not an "employer" under the statute.23 State and
local governments are excluded from the definition of "employer,"
as are employers subject to the Railway Labor Act.24
Because an "employee" is defined as a worker not explicitly
excluded by the statute and because workfare participants do not
seem to be encompassed by any of the exclusionary terms, work-
fare participants working for private employers appear to be cov-
ered by the NLRA. They may, however, face difficulty in being
included in a bargaining unit with paid workers. In the workfare
context, the primary difficulty with this incorporation will be the
struggle to have the participants included within the definition of
the relevant bargaining unit. The NLRB applies a "central test"
of whether the workers share a community of interests on issues
such as wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Fac-
tors that are considered include the employees' skills, duties, and
working conditions, the employer's organization and supervision,
and bargaining history.25 When new employees are added to an
existing bargaining unit, it is called "accretion," and the Office of
Collective Bargaining applies a similar "community of interests"
test. Factors such as integration of operations, geographic
proximity, working conditions, skills and functions, centraliza-
21 See In re Town of Massena, 15 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 15-4064 (1982)
(holding that Union petition was not premature since employees covered by instant
petition already had a substantial and continuing relationship that warranted rep-
resentation, and there was already sufficient information available, such as employ-
ees' work hours, work week, salaries, benefits, job duties, etc., to permit unit deter-
mination).
22 See 4 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 4, §§ 210.1-.3 (1999).
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
24 See id. § 152(2).
25 See Power Inc. v. NLRB, 40 F.3d 409,420 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
7771999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tion of management, and interchange of employees are exam-
ined.26
In Mon Valley United Health Services,27 the NLRB asserted
jurisdiction over a non-profit corporation that provided programs
and facilities throughout a four-county area for treatment of
mentally ill and mentally retarded persons. The Board found
that although the corporation's activities were funded by the
state, neither the state nor the counties that actually disperse
funds exerted control over the manner in which the corporation
utilized funds. Also, the corporation hired and fired employees
within the various programs without any intervention by the
counties and did not seek prior approval for any personnel action
it wished to take. Since the state did not exert the necessary con-
trols, the Board did not exempt the company from its jurisdiction.
In most cases dealing with welfare recipients, the govern-
ment argues that they are not employees because they are "com-
pensated" by their grant or entitlement from the state. The
Board, however, is usually hesitant to grant exemptions to its ju-
risdiction. In M.S.C. of East St. Louis,28 the Board had to decide
whether a pharmacy employer was engaged in a retail enter-
prise. The Board found that it was, despite the fact that a large
percentage of the consumers utilizing the employer's store were
welfare recipients whose prescription bills were ultimately paid
by a third party, making the source of the funds received by the
store irrelevant to the finding of jurisdiction. The Board found
that this funding arrangement did not change the essential na-
ture of the retail enterprise. It also analogized this arrangement
to other common third party prescription payment plans, such as
insurance carrier provided plans. This hesitancy to grant exemp-
tions to NLRB jurisdiction may factor into the possibility of or-
ganizing workfare workers.
D. Applying CETA By Analogy
Due to the programs' similarities, it may be possible to rely
upon cases brought on behalf of Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act ("CETA") workers in the 1970s and 1980s to prog-
26 See Teamsters Natl UPS Negotiating Comm. v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 1518, 1520
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Gould, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 442, 445 (1982)); see also NELP,
supra note 20, at 46.
27 238 N.L.R.B. 916 (1978).
28 226 N.L.R.B. 493 (1976).
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nosticate accurately about the future for workfare participants.
One should be aware, however, of the statutory language in
CETA, which provided that its workers should basically be ac-
corded the same benefits and conditions as non-CETA workers:
All persons employed in public service jobs shall be provided
workers' compensation, health insurance, unemployment bene-
fits, and other benefits and working conditions at the same level
and to the same extent as other employees working a similar
length of time, doing the same type of work and similarly classi-
fied. Any such classification must be reasonable and must in-
clude nonfederally financed employees.29
This provision may limit the usefulness of some CETA
precedent in the workfare context.
In Civil Service Employees Association v. County of Nassau,30
the court held that a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") in-
cluded within the term "employees" persons who held CETA-
funded positions prior to being placed in regular positions. The
court reasoned that the CBA had treated CETA workers as mu-
nicipal employees. Again, this decision may have limited appli-
cability in the workfare context because the CETA legislation ex-
pressly required CETA to be included in collective bargaining.3'
In Evergreen Legal Services,32 the Board found a sufficient
community of interest between CETA and non-CETA workers for
all to be included in a single bargaining unit. The Board distin-
guished previous decisions excluding CETA workers on their
facts. The Board did exclude, however, work-study students, who
received different wages and benefits. Significantly, this was the
class in which most workfare participants were likely to find
themselves. 33
In In re Amityville Public Schools,34 the Board found that
part-time reading teachers were public employees entitled to rep-
resentation despite the fact that the program was federally
funded. The implications of federal funding for the New York
State Department of Labor, Division of Employment, was also
considered in Matter of State of New York.35 During extensive
29 29 U.S.C. § 924(k) (1976) (repealed 1982).
30 420 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1979).
31 See NELP, supra note 20, at 44.
32 246 N.L.R.B. 964 (1979).
33 See NELP, supra note 20, at 46.
34 5 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 5-3043 (1972).
35 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7-3077 (1974).
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hearings, it was argued that there was a conflict of interest be-
tween employees who are paid from funds raised directly by the
employer and employees who are paid from funds allocated for
such purpose by the federal government. The source of funding
was not deemed significant in either decision.
In Somers Central School District,36 the Board found that
amendments to the CETA legislation that imposed an eighteen-
month limitation on employment of any individual did not pre-
clude CETA personnel from representation rights under the
Taylor Law. The prospect of employment for eighteen months
was found sufficient to create a substantial interest in terms and
conditions of employment warranting coverage under the law.
This determination was made particularly in light of the United
States Department of Labor regulation implementing the
amendments, which provided that CETA personnel engaged in
public service shall receive the same wages, benefits, and work-
ing conditions as those received by similarly employed employees
at the employing agency. The Board determined that this provi-
sion recognized CETA employees' interest in the terms and con-
ditions of their employment to be equal to that of other employ-
ees. CETA employees had long-term temporary status, and this
was recognized as a sufficient basis for representation eligibil-
ity.37
IV. APPLICABILITY OF STATUTES & STANDARDS TO WELFARE
WORKERS
A. In Civil Service
In Gotbaum v. Sugarman,38 a union official, civil service em-
ployees, and persons on the civil service eligibility list argued
that the employment of welfare recipients in a demonstration
project, where funding from the welfare department was paid in
the form of wages by the employing agencies, violated Article V,
Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of New York. They con-
tended that the welfare recipients were not appointed from com-
36 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3068 (1979).
37 See Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3004 (1979);
see also Village of Nassau, 14 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. $ 14-4022 (1981) (holding
Village's CETA-funded police officer was entitled to inclusion in an unit comprised of
one other full-time officer and two part-time officers).
38 358 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
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petitive civil service lists. The court rejected this argument on
the ground that the workers acquired no civil service status, were
temporary employees, and were paid from relief funds.
A similar contention based upon Article V, Section 6 of the
Constitution of the State of New York was raised by civil service
employees and their union in Ballentine v. Sugarman.39 The
claim was also rejected on the grounds that, based upon the na-
ture of their compensation, the workfare placements did not con-
stitute "appointments and promotions" under the Civil Service
Law.
In Connell v. Utica City Board of Education,4 a lower court
decision finding that petitioner was not an employee of the school
district was reversed. The higher court stated that though a
guidance counselor's position was financed primarily by federal
grants, this was not determinative of whether she was an em-
ployee of the school district and entitled to protection under the
tenure statutes.4
1
B. FLSA Status of Workfare Workers
Under the FLSA definition, an "employer" is "any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in rela-
tion to an employee."42 An "employee" is "any individual em-
ployed by an employer."43 Recently, the Tenth Circuit issued the
first reported decision addressing in the negative the question of
whether FLSA applied to workfare participants. In Johns v.
Stewart,44 plaintiffs challenged the compensation of participants
in two Utah workfare programs, which required a number of
hours of participation that did not permit the recipients to earn
their benefits at the level of the minimum wage. The court indi-
cated that the decisive question was whether the participants
39 344 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
40 483 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1984).
41 See Feinerman v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 399 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 1979);
Ricca v. Board of Educ., 391 N.E.2d 1322 (N.Y. 1979); Oneida City Bd. of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 385 N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 1978); see also Owens v. Arkport Cent. Sch. Dist, 402
N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1977) (holding that although teachers' em-
ployment was dependent upon availability of federal funds, it did not excuse district
from complying with appropriate sections of the Education Law).
42 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994).
43 Id. § 203 (e)(1).
44 57 F.3d 1544 (10th Cir. 1995).
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were "employees" for purposes of FLSA.45 The court relied heav-
ily on two of its prior decisions, Marshall and Klaips.
In Marshall v. Regis Educational Corp.,4 6 college resident
hall assistants were not "employees" under the FLSA, but were
recipients of financial aid. Alluding to "the totality of the circum-
stances,"47 the court focused on the education aspects of the pro-
gram, rather than the economic benefit of the students' efforts to
the college.48 In Klaips v. Bergland,49 the court ruled that none of
the Utah workfare program participants had an employment re-
lationship with the state, in the context of denying an employ-
ment-related food stamp deduction. The court noted that the
participants did not receive the same benefits and working condi-
tions as employees and that service in the program was a condi-
tion for public benefits eligibility, not a service to be directly
compensated.50
The Johns court indicated that the proper perspective was to
"focus 'upon the circumstances of the whole activity,' "51 or the
overall relationship of assistance, or employment to determine
which workers were employees. It criticized "[pilaintiffs' narrow
focus on the work component"52 of the programs, and it con-
trasted the treatment of state employees to that of workfare par-
ticipants. Accordingly, the court concluded that the workfare
participants were not employees for FLSA purposes.53
A New York court invalidated a workfare statute that re-
quired three days of work per week regardless of the amount of
the grant and resulted in many recipients working for less than
$1.00 an hour. It did this on the ground that it violated a provi-
sion in the New York constitution requiring that " '[nlo laborer,
workman or mechanic, in the employ of a contractor or subcon-
tractor engaged in the performance of any public works...
shall.., be paid less than the rate of wages prevailing in the
same trade or occupation in the locality within the state where
45 Id. at 1557.
46 666 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1981).
47 Id. at 1328.
48 See id. at 1327-28.
49 715 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1983).
50 See id. at 483.
51 Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1558 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)).
52 Id.
53 See id. at 1558-59; see also NELP, supra note 20, at 23.
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such public work is to be situated, erected or used.' "54 This deci-
sion may set the balance for calculating benefit eligibilities for
workfare participants.
C. Occupational Safety and Health of Workfare Workers
The standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(the "OSH Act")55 apply only to non-profit and private for-profit
workfare placements. State occupational safety and health laws
may also apply for placements with public employers. The OSH
Act imposes on "employers" two duties. First, there is a general
duty to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
his employees."56 Second, there is a specific duty to comply with
all standards promulgated under the OSH Act.57 The OSH Act
defines "employee" as "an employee of an employer who is em-
ployed in a business of his employer which affects commerce."58
An "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in a business af-
fecting commerce who has employees."59
The OSH Act's definition of "employer" has been construed
broadly to extend coverage to persons not directly employed by
the entity found responsible, usually in the context of general
contractor/subcontractor relations. Employers with little or no
control over the operations of others at the worksite (subcontrac-
tors) have the duty to exert reasonable efforts to protect their
own employees. General contractors, with supervisory capacity,
have a duty to protect all employees engaged at the worksite, not
just their own employees. 60
Explanations of the OSH Act definition of "employee" are
rare. A regulation indicates that "the existence of an employ-
ment relationship... is to be based upon economic realities
rather than upon common law doctrines and concepts."6' In ad-
54 Young v. Toia, 403 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (quoting N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 17).
55 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
56 Id. § 654(a)(1).
5 See id. § 654(a)(2).
58 Id. § 652(6).
59 Id. § 652(5).
60 See Marshall v. Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977).
61 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(a) (1998).
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dition, the OSH Act does not apply to an independent contractor
who is not an employee. 62
To pursue a violation of the OSH Act, one must make a com-
plaint to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
There is no private right of action under the OSH Act. Consis-
tent with these holdings, New York State, in a letter to the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
D.C. 37 NYC, indicated that it would consider workfare partici-
pants as public employees covered under the state's occupational
safety and health law.
D. Anti-Discrimination Statutes and Their Applicability to
Workfare Workers
Application of anti-discrimination principles to workfare
placements may be particularly important. For instance, if the
worker has a physical or mental impairment that interferes with
his or her successful performance of the assigned job, the appli-
cability of a "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA may
prevent termination of the worker's public benefits. A workfare
participant who is entirely reliant on her benefits may be espe-
cially vulnerable to an exploitative work environment including
sexual harassment, which will be exacerbated if laws prohibiting
sex discrimination in employment do not apply.
The standard employment anti-discrimination statutes in-
clude Title VII.63 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act also bar racial and handicap
discrimination, respectively, in federally funded programs, al-
though the focus in those contexts will be on the other statutes
that are more directly applicable to employment discrimination.
New York's Human Rights Law64 parallels much of the federal
law.
The general Title VII ADEA and ADA definition of "em-
ployee" is "an individual employed by an employer."65 Title VII
defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
62 See Cochran v. International Harvester Co., 408 F. Supp. 598, 602 (W.D. Ky.
1975).
63 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination based
upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994); Title I of the American with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
6 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993).
65 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4).
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commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person."66 The
ADEA's definition is similar, except that it requires employment
of twenty employees and does not mention agents.67 The ADA's
comparable definition was reduced from twenty-five to fifteen
employees in July 1994, and it also lacks a reference to agents of
an employer.68
There are not yet many cases on the discrimination aspect of
welfare worker protections. 69 The New York anti-discrimination
statute does have a broad "aid and abet" clause, which may help
to extend liability to non-employers for involvement in an unlaw-
ful discriminatory practice,7 0 but this is not conclusive. A federal
statute also exists that prevents race discrimination in the mak-
ing and enforcing of contracts. 71 While this provision reaches
employment relationships covered by Title VII, its scope is
broader and may provide useful to protect workfare workers
where Title VII fails.7-2
E. Unemployment Compensation for Workfare Workers
Unemployment compensation is a joint federal-state pro-
gram which provides income replacement for workers connected
to the labor market who have lost their employment through no
fault of their own. In general, workers will be eligible if. (1) they
have an adequate earnings history to establish financial eligibil-
ity (showing earnings over about a year-long period of time); (2)
they lost their jobs for reasons which were not their fault; (3)
they are able and available for work; and (4) they will accept
suitable work.
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
67 See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
0 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
69 See, e.g., Dumas v. Mount Vernon, 436 F. Supp. 866, 872-73 (S.D. Ala. 1977),
affd in part on other grounds, 612 F.2d 974, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
CETA workers were not counted as "employees" for jurisdictional purposes under
Title VII).
70 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
72 See, e.g., Mass v. McClenahan, 893 F. Supp. 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting
that "when Congress chose to protect the right to make and enforce contracts, it
meant to provide a sweeping remedy against racial discrimination").
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The Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") permits an
exception to unemployment compensation coverage requirements
for services performed as part of a work relief or work training
program.73 Unemployment Insurance Program Letter ("UIPL")
No. 16-86 similarly provides that if a work relief program was as-
sisted or financed in whole or part by any federal agency, state
agency, or political subdivision, unemployment compensation
coverage will not be required. States, however, were not pre-
cluded from providing coverage.
The statutory exclusions for work relief and work training
programs contained in many state unemployment compensation
statutes have been used in practice to deny benefits to workfare
participants. Several courts have rejected the argument that
welfare benefits received under such programs requalified a
claimant for UC benefits under a new claim. With the expansion
of workfare to new types of placements that more resemble pri-
vate employment, however, exclusions written in state unem-
ployment compensation law cannot be taken for granted. This
area is ripe for new developments.
F. Workers' Compensation for Workfare Recipients.
Workers' compensation programs typically provide medical
coverage and income replacement for work-connected injuries,
illnesses, and deaths. These programs typically use a form of
strict liability (negligence and related defenses are irrelevant)
and resolution of claims through an administrative system. In
exchange for these employer "concessions," workers' compensa-
tion benefits provide the exclusive remedy for workplace health
claims.74
Workers' compensation is a uniquely state benefits program,
with virtually no federal involvement. Therefore, workers' com-
pensation eligibility is determined by reviewing the workfare and
workers' compensation statutes and state law cases on workers'
compensation coverage. Some workfare statutes provide for
workers' compensation coverage, and New York decisions are
also applicable. 75
73 See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(5) (1994).
74 See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation §§ 6, 62 (1992).
75 See Allen v. City of New York, 554 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1990); see also Maiceo v. City of Yonkers, 32 N.Y.S.2d 349 (App. Div. 3d Dep't), affd,
43 N.E.2d 84 (N.Y. 1942).
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CONCLUSION
In sum, organized labor in the public sector recognizes the
opportunities for enhanced labor solidarity with the welfare
workforce, and is optimistic about transforming today's chal-
lenges into tomorrow's promise, for better working lives for eve-
ryone.
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